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The Dynamics of Open-Seat Campaigning:
A Case Study of Nevada's Second Congressional District
by Hilarie Hicks Robison
INTRODUCTION

CONFORMATION TO MODEL

Herrnson, however, provides a framework designed
Americans place great value on their democratic con-

specifically for analyzing open-seat campaigns. His model is

stitutional system, which emphasizes representation of the

based on two premises. First, open-seat elections are very

people. Congressional campaigns go to the very heart of this

competitive; they are nearly always won by much smaller mar-

democratic system in determining who will represent the

gins than races which involve an incumbent. Second, the two

American people. Consequently, it behooves us to study the

major factors which determine the outcome of an open-seat

processes and theories surrounding election campaigns. These

election include the partisanship of the district and the "skills

processes and theories will be presented in the following pages

and resources that candidates and their organizations bring to

as they are placed in context through a detailed case study of a

the campaign" (Herrnson 1995,216). The two factors out-

campaign race waged for the United States House of

lined in the second premise were indeed the most important

Representatives in 1996. The players are Republican James

in determining the outcome of Nevada's second Congressional

Gibbons and Democrat Thomas "Spike" Wilson, competing

District race. However, this race did not conform to

for the open seat in Nevada's second Congressional District.

Herrnson's first premise in being extremely competitive.
While the candidates followed Herrnson's prediction of

HERRNSON'S MODEL

Dr. Paul Herrnson, a distinguished professor and

acquiring nearly equal amounts of money (1995, 218), the
race was won by a large margin.

author from the University of Maryland, provides an excellent
framework for studying campaigns in his book Congressional
Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington (1995).

THESIS

Interestingly, the very fact that this race for Nevada's

The theoretical context for this study is based on Herrnson's

second district seat conformed to Hermson's second premise

work, not because other writers of merit do not exist, but

provides an explanation for its deviation from the first

because other authors focus on incumbent-challenger races,

premise. The race between Jim Gibbons and Spike Wilson

the dynamics of which are quite different from open-seat cam-

was won by a large margin precisely because of the party com-

paigns. For example, David Mayhew describes advertising,

position of the district and because of the inferiority of the

credit-claiming, and position-taking as the three activities in

skills and resources, i.e., lack of strategic ambition, that Spike

which Congressmen engage (1974). While an excellent analy-

Wilson and his organization brought to the campaign. Due to

sis, this has only a limited application to candidates not cur-

these two factors, the open-seat race to determine the repre-

rently holding elected office. As an interesting note, Jim

sentative for Nevada's second Congressional District does not

Gibbons' campaign manager did indicate that their campaign

conform entirely to Herrnson's model. In the pages that fol-

focused more on advertising (achieving name recognition for

low, the dynamics and intricacies of the campaign, which lead

the candidate) and position-taking rather than credit-claiming

to this conclusion, will be explored.

(Dayton 1996). This is to be expected for a non-incumbent.
Similarly, Richard Fenno's work on "home style," the way in
which a candidate presents himself to his district, applies primarily to incumbents (1978).
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THE NEVADA SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

At age 74, Barbara Vucanovich is widely considered
the most conservative woman serving in the House. Her pro-

GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

life stance serves to alienate Vucanovich from her female col-

Nevada's second Congressional District was created

leagues (Cook 1996, 31 January). She also often voted

by reapportionment in 1982, Until that time, all of the state

against other "women's issues," such as family and medical

was an at-large district. Geographically, this district encom-

leave. A breast cancer survivor, she now counts "good health"

passes a wide expanse of rural area, taking in nearly the entire

among her blessings (White 1995). According to

state of Nevada, minus only the city of Las Vegas. Although

Vucanovich, her decision to retire was based on a desire to

it comprises 99.8 percent of the state's land area (Cook 1996,

spend more time with her family. "It has been a great honor

31 January), the total district population is only 600,876.

to be here this year working on behalf of Nevadans and serv-

This primarily white population consists of generally

ing in the House Republican leadership during this historic

lower middle-class families. With 64 percent of voters registered

Congress. The time has come, however. for me to take off my

Republican, the NV second is labeled a "likely Republican" dis-

public service hat so I can spend more time with my husband,

trict (Cook 1996, 28 August). As recent presidential elections

George, and my family" (White 1 995).

testify, the area is very friendly toward Republicans, but a tough

Vucanovich's decision to retire reversed an earlier

arena for Democrats. In 1988, Bush received 65 percent here; in

announcement in June of 1995, that she would seek an eighth

1992, Bush received 38, Clinton 33, and Perot 28 percent

term. Vucanovich served as Chairman of the Appropriations

(Cook 1996, 31 January). Of the seventeen counties represent-

Subcommittee on Military Construction. She was also elected

ed by the second district, the number of registered Democrats

Secretary of the House GOP Conference. Although

outweigh registered Republicans in only four.

Representative Vucanovich belongs

Approximately 55 percent of the district is located

[Q

the conservative wing

that swept Congress in 1994, her retirement may have been

in the metropolitan areas of Reno and Carson City, the state

affected by Hermson's theory that elections following an

capitol; 30 percent is suburban Las Vegas; and the remainder

upheaval within Congress are marked by a large number of

is rural Nevada. Consequently, classic "western state issues"

retirements (1995, 33).

such as mining and grazing laws, as well as an interest unique
to Nevada, i.e., gaming, are important. Nevada's second dis-

THE PRIMARY RACE

trict generally is seen as part of the conservative westem bloc,
but has little impact nationally.

Hermson's model predicts that an open seat will
draw a large number of primary contestants, as well as more

REPRESENTATIVE BARBARA VUCANOVICH

CR, NY)

Since its creation in 1982, conservative Republican
Barbara Vucanovich has represented Nevada's second

money and resources (1995, 17). This was certainly true of
the primary elections in Nevada's second district, especially in
the Republican party.

Congressional District. In December of 1995, while serving
her seventh term, Representative Vucanovich announced that
she would not seek reelection. Though she received 64 per-

REpUBLICAN CANDIDATES

Spurred by Vucanovich's retirement in this

cent of the vote in 1994, 1992 was a different story. In a

Republican district, there was no shortage of qualified, experi-

field of numerous candidates, Vucanovich retained her seat

enced GOP candidates vying for the nomination. As

with only 48 percent of the vote (Cook 1996, 31 January).

Hermson predicts, the race pitted several state elected offi-

Fear of losing a reelection bid, however, did not evidently

cials against each other (1995,46). The GOP roster boasted

affect her decision to retire.

Vucanovich's own daughter, Patty Cafferata; state
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Assemblyman Jim Gibbons; former Secretary of State Cheryl

guished, boasting former Virginia City prostitute Jesse

Lau; rural miner Pat Macmillan; Las Vegas attorney Mike

Winchester; security guard Mike Martin; and David Ward, a

Schaefer; stockbroker Hilary Milko; retiree Bob Edwards; and

cable TV salesman who dropped out before the primary race.

State Treasurer Bob Seale.

It was not until the last day to file, June 4, that Thomas

As the incumbent's daughter, Patty Cafferata was
expected to have an edge in the race. She was a former Reno
assembly member, ex-State Treasurer, unsuccessful candidate

"Spike" Wilson added his name to the list of candidates for
the Democratic primary race.
Wilson, a Reno attorney and "fiscal conservative,"

for governor in 1986, and currently the district attorney for

served in the state Senate and on the Nevada Ethics

Lander County. Strongly pro-life, Cafferata labeled herself as

Commission (Morrison 1996). Among the Democrats, he

"the most conservative of the candidates running" (American

provided the only evidence of political experience or qualifica-

Political Network 1996, 8 March). She promised to get gov-

tions. Due to his late entry, Wilson had little time to solicit

ernment "off the backs of and out of the pockets of citizens"

campaign contributions for the primary season, but he did

(American Political Network 1996,8 March).

receive over $ 80,000, which he added to $ 100,000 of his own

Jim Gibbons had served in the state Assembly and,

money (FEC 1996, September).

as the Republican nominee for governor in 1994, garnered 4 I
percent of the vote against incumbent Bob Miller. In favor of
abortion rights, Gibbons labeled himself a mainstream conser-

THE RESULTS

Nevada's primary election was held on September 3,

vative. Treasurer Bob Seale claimed to be "conservative on fis-

1996. It produced no surprises. Gibbons won the

cal issues" (American Political Network 1996,8 March). He

Republican primary with 43 percent of the vote, followed by

also favors abortion rights.

Cafferata and Lau. In the Democratic primary, Wilson won

In this campaign for the U.S. House, Gibbons'

handily with 62 percent of the votes despite his late entry

internal polls, conducted by Wirthlin Worldwide in May of

(Vogel 1996, 4 September). Although Herrnson calls open-

1996, showed him leading the GOP pack by a margin of more

seat primaries "the most competitive of all nominating con-

than 40 points against Cafferata and Seale (American Political

tests" (1995,46), both Gibbons and Wilson won their pri-

Network 1996, 8 March). As Herrnson would predict,

maries by significant margins (20 percent for Gibbons and

Gibbons' early lead in the polls helped to attract substantial

nearly 40 percent for Wilson). This is additionally surprising

campaign funding (1995,218). Throughout the primary sea-

in the Republican camp because of the qualifications and

son, Gibbons received more than $265,000 in campaign con-

experience of the other candidates. Perhaps the wide margin

tributions, compared to Cafferata's $95,000 and Seale's

of victory reflects the large differences in the amount of cam-

$82,000 (FEC 1996, September).

paign funding each candidate was able to acquire.

A poll conducted in July by the Las Vegas ReviewJournal confirmed Gibbons' internal findings; he led his

THE CANDIDATES

Republican primary challengers as well as Democrats (Morrison
1996). Due to the findings of this poll, Bob Seale dropped out

Hermson submits that the best qualified office-seek-

of the race, blaming his poor showing in the polls for blocking

ers wait until an open seat becomes available rather than face a

his fundraising efforts (Morrison 1996). Ironically, he withdrew

formidable incumbent (1995, 36). The two candidates for

too late to have his name removed from the ballot and finished

Nevada's second Congressional District's open seat could both

fourth in the race with 4 percent of the vote (Vogel 9/4/96).

be considered experienced. Gibbons had the advantage of

DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES

name recognition from having run a state-wide election previ-

The Democratic primary roster was less distin-

ously. (Because the district covers the entire state, campaign-
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ing in it is virtually the same as running for a state-wide

tures are particularly influential" in spreading a candidate's

office.) Wilson's delay in filing his candidacy perhaps illus-

name recognition and message (1995,218). Gibbons

trates his hesitancy to run as a Democrat in such a conservative

achieved this advantage by entering the race early and behaving

district. Though Gibbons was not an incumbent, Wilson may

strategically, while Wilson missed out because he filed his can-

have seen his opponent as a formidable challenge. Ironically,

didacy much later.

the two men's careers have evolved along similar paths.
DEMOCRAT THOMAS "SPIKE" WILSON
REpUBLICAN JAMES GIBBONS

A native Nevadan, Jim Gibbons earned his law

Unfortunately, it is necessary to begin here with a
disclaimer. Spike Wilson's campaign offices and staff were

degree, then became a pilot for Delta Airlines. Previously, he

less than helpful in providing information. Due to their

worked as a mining geologist and served in the United States

refusal to answer questions and provide campaign literature,

Air Force, experiencing combat duty as a secret-missions pilot

the sources used to compile a profile of Spike Wilson and his

in the Vietnam War and voluntarily in the Persian Gulf during

campaign are quite limited. This difficulty in dealing with the

Operation Desert Storm. Gibbons, age fifty-one, is proud of

candidate and his campaign suggest that Wilson is not overly

his wife, daughter, and two sons, whose pictures he flaunted

personable or helpful, which are qualities heavily associated

throughout various campaign literature.

with casework. Perhaps Wilson's apparent weakness in con-

Gibbons served three terms in the Nevada State

stituency relations stems from the fact that he knew he was

Assembly, where he authored the popular Gibbons Tax

waging a lost-cause campaign. From the beginning, Wilson

Restraint Initiative. This initiative, requiring all tax increases

knew his chances for victory were minimal, but "this is a race

to be approved by two-thirds of the state legislature, was on

that someone had to make ... .! had a ball" (Wilson quoted in

the ballot this year and passed quite easily on election night

Morrison and Vogel 1996).

(Morrison and Vogel 1996,6 November). As the Republican

Thomas "Spike" Wilson, age sixty-one, was also

nominee for governor in 1994, Gibbons made this conserva-

born and raised in Nevada. He served as a federal prosecutor,

tive legislation the centerpiece of his campaign (American

then became a partner in a law firm with offices in Reno and

Political Network 1994, 13 October). Though seen as a con-

Las Vegas. As a Democrat, he served from 1970 until 1986

servative Republican, Gibbons was labeled by the Abortion

in the Nevada State Senate, where he claimed to be "fiscally

Report as pro-choice (American Political Network 1994, 19

conservative" and "careful with your l constituents'] tax dol-

October) and declared that government should not involve

lars" (Morrison 1996). Wilson helped to create the biparti-

itself in the abortion issue (Gibbons and Cafferata 1996).

san Nevada Commission on Ethics in Government in 1985,

Gibbons fits the criteria for what Herrnson calls a

and served as its chair from 1989 until 1996. In 1991, he

strategic politician. Candidates who behave strategically pos-

received the Ethics in Government award from Nevada Common

sess "a desire to get elected, a realistic understanding of what

Cause (Wilson 1996).

it takes to win, and an ability to assess the opportunities pre-

Though a Democrat, Wilson declined to align him-

sented" (Hermson 1995, 3 1). Gibbons fits this category

self with Clinton and his party in this conservative district.

because he obviously exercised much thought and preparation

Calling himself the "independent voice for Nevada," Wilson

in evaluating his candidacy. He announced his candidacy on

promised that he would not be another "sure" vote for party

December 5, 1995, long before any other competitors. With

leaders. "Congress must stop the finger pointing and partisan

this head start, Gibbons began raising money (and thus

bickering, and put the very best ideas of both parties to work"

spending money) and conducting polls early in the campaign

(Wilson 1996). Despite Clinton's general popularity nation-

season. As Herrnson illustrates, "a campaign's initial expendi-

wide, Wilson evidently realized that, due to the conservative

HILARJE HICKS ROBISON
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nature of this district, aligning himself with the president

committees (PACs), and party committees than will a chal-

would not be politically profitable.

lenger race (1995, 17). With high political stakes up for

Although Wilson was politically experienced, having

grabs in an open seat, many groups find it advantageous to

campaigned and held office in the state, it is doubtful whether

support their candidate of choice. Hence, both Spike Wilson

he behaved strategically in this campaign. Institutionally,

and Jim Gibbons received substantial campaign contributions,

strategic politicians examine factors including filing deadlines

Candidates are required to report the contributions

and campaign finance laws (Herrnson 1995, 3 I). Wilson

they receive to the Federal Election Commission (FEC),

seemed to lack understanding regarding both of these factors.

which then makes this information available to the public. In

He barely met the filing deadline and failed to conform to

the general election, Jim Gibbons spent nearly $ 500,000. He

Federal Election Commission rules requiring a declaration of

received most of his money, close to $400,000, from individ-

receipts and contributions (Paxon 1996).

ual contributors. PACs, primarily those associated with casi-

Structural factors involved in strategic ambition
include examining the geography and partisan composition of
the district (Herrnson 1995, 3 I). If Wilson did make such

nos and other businesses, donated approximately $ 130,000 to
the Gibbons campaign (FEC 1996, December).
Although Herrnson's framework predicts that the

an examination, he did not heed the warning signs. The large,

party not in control of the presidency (in this case, the

sprawling district is Republican-dominated and requires exten-

Republican party) will use more of its resources to support

sive travel and money to spread one's name and message

incumbents (1995,80), the National Republican

throughout the district. A poll taken during the primary sea-

Congressional Committee gave the maximum contribution

son indicated that 53 percent of the district's voters did not

allowed to the Jim Gibbons campaign. After all. the commit-

even recognize Wilson's name (Morrison 1996). In contrast

tee's primary goal is to maximize its party's seats in Congress,

with Bob Seale, however, Wilson opted to remain in the race,

and the Nevada second district seat was "likely Republican"

saying the numbers did not depress him. "I just see room for

(Cook Political Report 1996, 28 August).

growth" (Morrison 1996).
Wilson may have focused on national forces, such as

From the beginning of the general election, Gibbons
led Wilson in the polls and the lead continued to widen as the

Clinton's likely victory, instead of local circumstances as a

election drew closer (American Political Network 1996,4

strategic politician would (Herrnson 1995, 31). According to

October). Given this lead in the polls, Herrnson theorizes

Herrnson's model, a politician behaving strategically would not

that Gibbons will attract more money and resources than

run in the circumstances Wilson met. On the other hand, our

Wilson (1995,218). This proved true in the Nevada second

democratic idealism prefers the presence of an opponent with

district campaign, but the difference was quite small. Spike

slim chances to a strategic politician in an unopposed race.

Wilson spent approximately S450,000 on the general election
(FEC 1996, December).

CAMPAIGN FINANCES

Wilson received almost $250,000 from individual
contributors. Most of his PAC money, totaling over

With each successive election year, the amount of

$ 1 00,000, was donated by national organizations, such as the

money it takes to wage a campaign increases. Many have spec-

Federal Express PAC and the National Education Association

ulated on the impact such money-centered campaigns have on

PAC, as well as labor organizations. Interestingly, a number of

our democratic system, but here it is necessary only to analyze

casino corporations that contributed to Gibbons' campaign

its effects in the race at hand. As pointed out earlier,

also gave money to Spike Wilson (FEe 1996, October and

Herrnson's framework predicts that an open seat will attract

December; Kanigher and McCall 1996). Evidently, these casi-

more money and assistance from individuals, political action

no PACs exercise access strategies, contributing to both candi-
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dates so that they are guaranteed access regardless of who

challengers and those by incumbents in regard to the profes-

wins the election (Herrnson [995, 110), Information

sionalization of the staff and organization. The majority are

regarding the Democratic Congressional Campaign

managed by a paid staffer, some have professional media con-

Committee's involvement in Wilson's campaign is unavailable.

sultants, and most candidates have their polling done by pro-

Despite the integral role that money seems to play

fessionals. Other functions, such as press relations, fundrais-

in modern elections, it is not always the most important fac-

ing, and issue research, is often done by volunteers in open

tor. Although Gibbons and Wilson spent similar amounts of

seat campaigns (Herrnson 1995,64-69).

money, there was a wide margin between them in the election

Due to my difficulty in obtaining information from

results. Perhaps voters do see beyond the resources money

the Wilson campaign, I cannot compare his campaign organi-

can buy. Or, as is more likely in this case, party identification

zation to the model; however, Gibbons' campaign largely con-

is simply more important to voters than how many television

forms to Herrnson's pattern for organization. Jim Gibbons'

ads a candidate can buy.

campaign manager, Mike Dayton, was a paid professional.
Wirthlin Worldwide, a well-known and respected firm, con-

ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL

ducted several polls for Gibbons. His campaign relied on
outside political consultants for some advice on advertising.

Numerous factors playa significant role in the out-

and the National Republican Congressional Committee pro-

come of a campaign for office. Obviously, the role of money

vided its research. The rest of Gibbons' campaign staff was

is very substantial, as has been discussed. Beyond that, how-

comprised of volunteers, who handled press relations and

ever, variables such as campaign organization and staff, priori-

fundraising (Dayton 1996). The entire Gibbons family was

ties made in determining the campaign budget, and campaign

involved in the campaign, especially the candidate's son,

strategies, including the issues, themes, and messages which a

Christopher, age twenty-one, who designed an Internet home

candidate embraces, are extremely significant. Each of these

page for his father: http://www.gibbons4congress.com.

factors can be used in such a way as to mean the difference
between winning and losing an election.

CAMPAIGN BUDGETS

In addition to the organization of campaign staff,
CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATIONS

In Herrnson's model of campaign staff and organiza-

the professionalism of a congressional campaign can be Judged
by how its money is budgeted. In the way they allocate funds,

tions, incumbents clearly have an advantage with more experi-

there are virtually no differences among incumbents, chal-

enced staff and resources (I 99 5, 63). In the open seat race at

lengers, and open-seat candidates. Generally, candidates spend

hand, however, Herrnson indicates that nonincumbents who

76 percent of campaign funds in voter communication, J 8

have previously held an elected position have an advantage in

percent for overhead expenses, and 6 percent on polling and

assembling their campaign organization (1995,64). Both

research. Further breaking down the voter communication

Gibbons and Wilson held elected posts, but neither of them

percentages, most candidates budget J J percent of their total

had an ongoing support club. Their respective organizations,

funds for radio, [8 percent for televislOn, another J 8 percent

the "Jim Gibbons for Congress Committee," and "Nevadans

for direct mail, 4 percent for newspapers, and the remaining

for 'Spike' Wilson" were both organized specifically for this

25 percent for field activities. (Herrnson 1995,73)

race. However, it is most likely that each candidate has a tight

As discussed above, this information is not available

circle of staunch supporters who have been through other

for the Wilson campaign, and Gibbons' campaign budget

state and local campaigns with him.

largely does not conform to Herrnson's model, due primarily

Open seat campaigns fall between those waged by

to the geographical expanse of Nevada's 2nd district and some

HILARlE HICKS ROBISON
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As Herrnson points out, campaigns do not intend to
reach everyone; that would be impossible. Instead, most can-

head, Gibbons' campaign manager indicated that their overhead

didates focus their campaign efforts on members of their own

comprised closer to 5 percent of the budget because of numer-

party and independent voters (Hermson 1995, 164). This is

ous in-kind donations. Field activities, including travel, make

true of the Jim Gibbons campaign, but there is no available

up only 10 percent of the Gibbons budget. This is surprising

information regarding Spike Wilson's targeting strategies.

in a district where campaigning requires travel throughout the

In addition to this general targeting, Herrnson dis-

entire state. (Perhaps Gibbons' employment as a pilot for

cusses the importance of soliciting specific groups of voters;

Delta Airlines facilitated this.) Approximately 5 percent was

" ... communicating a message to identifiable groups of sup-

spent on polling, done by Wirthlin Worldwide, and 10 percent

porters and undecided voters is important in the campaign for

on direct mail. In describing open-seat races, Herrnson theo-

votes" (Herrnson 1995, 166). The Gibbons campaign used

rizes that" direct mail has the biggest impact on vote shares,

Herrnson's group-oriented approach, which says that "there

followed by radio and television" (1995, 2 19). Gibbons' allo-

are identifiable segments of the population whose support the

cation of funds does not exactly fit Herrnson's pattern.

campaign needs to attract and that specific communications

The major discrepancies between Gibbons and the

can be tailored to win that support" (Herrnson 1995, 166).

typical campaign are in the amount spent on radio and televi-

According to Gibbons' campaign manager and as evidenced by

sion advertisements. As is becoming more common every

his campaign literature, the Republican candidate focused on

election year, television was the major budgetary item in the

specific population segments like veterans and seniors.

campaign. While Gibbons spent only 5 percent of his total

As a veteran of two wars himself, Gibbons already had

budget on radio, a phenomenal 60 percent went toward televl--

one foot in the door WIth that group. Gibbons designed his

sion (Dayton 1996). These discrepancies may be explained

crime reduction plan to protect "our neighborhoods from vio-

by looking at the different media markets throughout the

lent criminals who prey on our society's most vulnerable: our

state. To reach the entire second district, a candidate not only

elderly citizens and our children" (Jim Gibbons, Plan 1996).

has to advertise in Reno and the extensive rural areas, but also

Citing the contributions that seniors and veterans have made to

in the Las Vegas area, where 20,000 of the district's registered

the state of Nevada, Gibbons vowed to protect them. "We can

voters reside. In this urban center's media market, television

count on Jim Gibbons and his commitment to Nevada seniors

advertising is costly, but radio is less expensive and one radio

and veterans" (Jim Gibbons, Uncommon 1996). Spike Wilson

station may reach a larger number of voters.

also tried to reach out to seniors, promising "I won't vote to
cut Social Security" (Wilson 1996).

CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

Campaigns do not just "happen." They are carefully planned and designed; the candidate, together with politi-

MESSAGE

The campaign message is a combination of imagery

cal consultants, family, and friends, thinks through every

and the candidate's position on certain issues. Herrnson

move he makes. Analyzing what will appeal to voters in the

describes the most successful messages as thematic, prevalent

current environment is quite an art, one which every candi-

throughout every ad, pamphlet, and speech. In an attempt to

date tries to perfect. To do so, they choose which groups of

project a coherent image of the candidate, messages are gener-

voters to target and the message, including issues and image,

ally a mixture of party affiliation, issue positions, personal

which they will portray throughout the campaign. Much of

accomplishments, and qualifications for office (Herrnson

this is manifested in campaign literature.

1995, 168-9). Especially in a close race, campaign messages

TARGETING

can become a determining factor in the outcome of the election. Though not the most important ingredient, candidate

42
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messages were important in the race for Nevada's second

advertisements. This image of a caring family man essentially

Congressional District.

became Gibbons' "home style" (Fenno 1978) and served well

In an open seat, Hermson's model predicts that
candidates will strive to portray themselves as "caring, hard-

as an overarching theme that hit home with numerous voters.
Issues. Spike fared better in presenting his issues

working, and experienced" (1995, 170). In Nevada's sec-

than his image. Clearly, this Democrat understood the impor-

ond district, Jim Gibbons embraced all three attributes

tance of alienating himself from the Clinton/Gore ticket in

quite successfully, while Spike Wilson emphasized his quali-

this district. Stressing his independence, Spike promised not

fications and what his agenda would be as a member of

to be "another sure vote for the leaders of either party"

Congress. While both candidates chose a few issues to

(Wilson 1 996). His primary issue focus was on families.

emphasize, only Gibbons was successful in portraying a

Despite his promise to be an independent voice, Spike Jumped

coherent image of himself.

on the national bandwagon in calling for tax credits for child

Image. Wilson's campaign "image" consisted of a
picture of himself, the headline "We like Spike," and the subtitle "the Independent voice for Nevada" (Wilson 1996). As a

care and education, health insurance access and portability, and
pay and pension equity for working women (Wilson 1996).
These family issues did not exactly play out as

Democrat in a largely Republican district, he was trying to

Wilson's trump card, however. Wilson simply talked about

disassociate himself from the party ticket. Voters were not

helping families, while Gibbons portrayed it in action. As it

given the opportunity to meet Spike as a person, even through

is said, a picture is worth a thousand words; or a thousand

simple words on paper. A few qualifications were listed, but

votes, as the case may be. Wilson also talked about "ending

no family was ever introduced (Spike is divorced), and trust-

corporate welfare" through changes in tax policy and achieving

worthiness or caring were not discussed. To some Nevadans,

political reform through tough ethics (Wilson 1996).

Spike may have come across as a cold politician. With the

Jim Gibbons' focus on a few broad issues further

large party barrier to overcome, this lukewarm portrayal of

helped him achieve coherence as he repeated his message in

Spike Wilson's image was quite a blunder. Evidently, Wilson

every ad and leaflet. Gibbons followed Hermson's model in

was attempting to portray a "home style" (Fenno 1978) that

identifying himself with valence issues (Hermson 1995,

focused on experience and a future agenda more than identify-

170). He took policy stands on protecting seniors and veter-

ing with the people as one of them.

ans, cracking down on crime, and improving education-

Republican candidate Jim Gibbons scored high

issues which generate little controversy and draw large sup-

points in the portrayal of a consistent, likeable, and comfort-

port. While he outlined specific policy goals, Gibbons con-

able image. He stressed his past record of fighting for

tinually emphasized the broader valence issues. Gibbons also

Nevadans and filled his campaign literature with pictures of a

campaigned on the issue of tax restraint, echoing the initiative

caring Jim Gibbons reading to children or helping seniors find

he authored that was passed at the same time he was elected

solutions to their problems (Jim Gibbons, Uncommon 1996).

to Congress. In this Republican district, Gibbons did not

Gibbons also used his role as an Air Force veteran to transmit

shie away from the Dole-Kemp national ticket and openly sup-

a certain image of patriotism and honor, saying "I was willing

ported Dole's plan for a 1 5 percent across-the-board tax cut

to fight for my country-I'm willing to fight for Nevada"

(Vogel 1996, 27 October). Wilson opposed any tax cut until

(Jim Gibbons 1995). Both the military and politics are about

Congress balances the budget (Vogel 1996,27 October).

leadership and public service.
The most consistently-used image, however, was a

During the primary campaign, Gibbons addressed a
wider array of issues, especially emphasizing classic states'

lovely portrait of Jim with his wife and three children. It was

rights in claiming that the "federal government is too heavy-

included in every piece of direct mail and many television

handed" (Henley 1996), and therefore we should "let Nevadans
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run Nevada" (Chris Gibbons, Jim's Stand 1996). In issues

story about Spike Wilson," they labeled him as an out-of-

regarding Nevada's mining and ranching interests, Gibbons

touch politician (NV Republican Party 1996).

claimed that the federal government has been" waging war on

In the last weeks of the campaign, Wilson accused

the west" (Henley 1996), in preventing Nevada from control-

Gibbons of "attack ads" and Gibbons tried to paint Wilson as

ling its own state land. True to his party, Wilson favored leav-

a Clinton liberal (Morrison and Vogel 1996). Discussing

ing Nevada's lands in the hands of the federal government.

Clinton's interventions in Iraq, the two candidates got their

Gibbons also argued in favor of popular national issues, such as

hands a little muddy. Wilson bordered on calling Gibbons, a

balancing the federal budget, welfare reform, and revamping

veteran of two wars, unpatriotic (Vogel 1996, 19 September).

Medicare (Chris Gibbons, Jim's Stand 1996). However, all of
these issues faded into the background during the general elec-

AND THE WINNER

Is .....

tion campaign in favor of those discussed above.
In the Wilson campaign, issues were used more

The results of the general election held on

extensively than images. Gibbons also focused on issues, but

November 5, 1996, like those of the primary, were not unex-

his family picture, so prevalent throughout the campaign,

pected. They were in line with results indicated in earlier

seemed to be the overriding theme. Perhaps due to the large

polls (Morrison 1996; American Political Network 1996, 30

and diverse nature of the district, both candidates steered

May). For the open seat in Nevada's second Congressional

away from local concerns, (which have the potential to arouse

District, Republican Jim Gibbons won with 58 percent of the

opposing viewpoints in the urban and rural areas) to embrace

vote. Gibbons beat Democrat Spike Wilson, who garnered 36

larger issues. Gibbons' family portrait served as a universal

percent of the vote, by a margin greater than 20 percentage

theme, striking chords in this area largely populated by tradi-

points (Morrison and Vogel 1996).

tional families. Also due to the district's extensive geographic

In order to explain the outcome of this race, there

area, Gibbons and Wilson were required to travel and cam-

are several relevant factors to address. These include the types

paign throughout the state, walking the neighborhoods every-

and groups of voters which supported each candidate, the

where from Elko to Las Vegas. Out of necessity, both candi-

national context in which the race took place, and the party

dates maintained offices and campaign personnel in Reno as

identification within the district. Also, it is interesting to

well as Las Vegas.

explore the explanation given by the losing candidate.
Gibbons was supported throughout the race and in

NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING

This congressional race was clouded by very little

his victory by traditionally conservatIve Republican groups, such
as the National Rifle Association and Citizens for Responsible

negative campaigning. The candidates participated in seven

Government, as well as business-related associations like the

debates together and remained civil in each one (Vogel 1996,

U.S. Chamber of Commerce. These groups endorsed Jim

27 October). Both Gibbons' and Wilson's television cam-

Gibbons, as did other local and state associations (Chris

paign advertisements remained relatively positive, but a couple

Gibbons, Endorsements 1996; Vogel 1996, 2 7 October). Also,

of incidences are noteworthy.

retiring Representative Barbara Vucanovich endorsed Gibbons in

In particular, the Nevada Republican Party published

the general campaign (after he defeated her daughter in the pri-

a pamphlet attacking Spike Wilson's history of voting in favor

mary), calling him "a man of integrity, decency, and a sense of

of raising taxes on Nevada citizens. According to their cam-

compassion" (NV Republican Party 1996).

paign literature, Wilson voted to raise his legislative salary and

Wilson also had numerous supporters and endorse-

perks twelve times and to raise taxes and fees over three hun-

ments, especially from state and local unions, such as the

dred times while serving in the state senate. Telling the "real

Nevada AFL-CIO, the Nevada State Education Association,
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and the Service Employees International Union Local 1864
(Vogel 1996,27 October). An obvious difference is the

Gibbons, had a clear advantage based on party cue voting.
Neither Jim Gibbons nor Spike Wilson was sur-

national scope of the groups which supported Gibbons versus

prised by the outcome of the race. In line with Herrnson's

the local nature of Spike's supporters. National groups like

theory that winners attribute their success to image and issues

the NRA have a broader membership and more money with

(I 99 5, 219), Gibbons credited his victory to his past experi-

which they can support the candidate. This gave Gibbons an

ence and issue positions. Although it is natural for Spike to

edge in the campaign and demonstrates the power of endorse-

be disappointed, he knew from the beginning that for him this

ment as a resource.

race was basically a lost cause (Morrison and Vogel 1996).

The population segments which voted for Gibbons

As discussed earlier, he knew his chances were very slim and

and Wilson mirror the types of groups and associations which

thus he did not put forth the effort necessary to be competi-

supported each candidate. Republicans overwhelmingly chose

tive; i.e., Spike did not behave strategically. Hence,

Gibbons, as did many Independents and some Democrats.

Herrnson's model that shows the losing candidate placing

Many Democrats toed the party line in voting for Spike, but

blame and obsessing about money (1995, 219) does not

they were simply outnumbered by registered Republicans in

apply here. Spike Wilson did not blame anyone for his defeat,

the district (Dayton 1996). Clearly, this race is a good exam-

instead positioning himself almost as a martyr for the democ-

ple of party politics.

ratic system. Spike can be seen as a candidate who entered the

Although redistricting was not a factor in this race,
the presence of a presidential election did playa role. As

race simply to provide an element of opposition, without any
real hope of personal victory.

Herrnson points out, presidential election years spur a larger
turnout of voters (1995, 17). Such years also have a poten-

CONCLUDING ANALYSIS

tial for coattail effects, but these were not realized in the
Nevada second district race nor throughout the nation. In the

In Herrnson's model, open-seat races are character-

case at hand, Clinton's coattails may have been replaced by

ized by their intense competition. Yet at no time on election

those of Representative John Ensign of Nevada's first

night (or throughout the campaign season) was this race "too

Congressional District.

close to cal\." What explains the deviation in this race from

Ensign, a staunch Republican, served as a freshman

Herrnson's theory?

There are two reasons that the race for

in the 104th Congress and retained his seat by a huge margin

Nevada's second Congressional District was won by 22 per-

of victory in 1996. Ensign has been very popular with casino

centage points instead of the small margin predicted by

magnates as well as the general populace, so the several public

Hermson. First, the majority of voters in the district identi-

appearances he made with Gibbons may have brought in more

fied themselves as Republicans, which was a heavy weight in

money and votes for the second district candidate (see

favor of Gibbons. Second, Wilson did not behave as a strate-

Morrison and Vogel 1996; Vogel 1996, 4 September).

gic politician. Spike's delay in filing his candidacy, his mis-

The most important factor in determining the out-

takes in reporting to the FEC, and his weakness in constituent

come of this race was undoubtedly the party cue. Herrnson's

relations (casework), because he saw his campaign as a lost

theory includes explanations for voting decisions. One of

cause, all point to this conclusion. Hermson predicts that

these explanations is that voters will choose the candidate with

only strategic politicians will be successful; Spike was not

whose political party they identify themselves. This party cue

strategic, so the race was not highly competitive and he lost

"also enables voters to speculate about a candidate's ideological

by a wide margin.

orientation and issue positions" (Herrnson 1995, 159). In
Nevada's second district, the Republican party, and hence Jim

This study of an open-seat race in Nevada's second
Congressional District, in the context of Herrnson's frame-

HILARIE HICKS ROBISON

work and the J 996 election, provides insight into the ele-
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_ _ _ _ . J 996. Nevada Congressional races.

ments that are necessary to wage a successful campaign, Such

http://www.electionline.com/HTEL/shounvOfront 96/page

a campaign is an example of the very processes that are inte-

I.cgi. September.

gral to our American democratic constitutional system.
_ _ _ _ . 1996. Nevada district 2 census information.
http://www.electionline.com/HTEL/ dhoun vO 2cens us 90/ p
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